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Toys.	  The	  symbol	  grounding	  problem	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  causally	  connecting	  symbols	  inside	  an	  autonomous	  system	  to	  their	  referents	  in	  the	  external	  world	  without	  the	  mediation	  of	  an	  external	  interpreter.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  avoid	  triviality,	  however,	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  symbols	  in	  question,	  their	  referents	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  dynamic	  capacities	  of	  the	  autonomous	  system	  interacting	  with	  the	  world	  are	  nontrivial.	  Otherwise	  a	  toy	  robot,	  with	  exactly	  two	  symbols	  –	  go/stop	  –	  is	  “grounded”	  in	  a	  world	  where	  it	  goes	  until	  it	  bumps	  into	  something	  and	  stops.	  
Turing.	  From	  the	  very	  outset,	  the	  symbol	  grounding	  problem	  –	  which	  was	  inspired	  and	  motivated	  by	  Searle’s	  Chinese	  Room	  Argument	  –	  was	  based	  on	  the	  Turing	  Test,	  and	  hence	  on	  a	  system	  with	  full,	  human-­scale	  linguistic	  capacity.	  So	  it	  is	  the	  words	  of	  a	  full-­‐blown	  natural	  language	  (not	  all	  of	  them,	  but	  the	  ones	  that	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  by	  definition	  in	  the	  others)	  that	  need	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  their	  referents	  in	  the	  world.	  Have	  we	  solved	  that	  problem?	  Certainly	  not.	  Nor	  do	  we	  have	  a	  robot	  with	  Turing-­‐scale	  capacities,	  either	  symbolic	  or	  sensorimotor	  (with	  the	  former	  grounded	  –	  embodied	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  the	  latter).	  Designing	  or	  reverse-­‐engineering	  an	  autonomous	  system	  with	  this	  Turing-­‐scale	  robotic	  and	  linguistic	  capacity	  	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  thereby	  causally	  explaining	  it	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  cognitive	  science.	  (Grounding,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  meaning;	  for	  that	  we	  would	  also	  have	  to	  give	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  consciousness,	  i.e.,	  feeling,	  and	  that,	  unlike	  passing	  the	  Turing	  Test,	  is	  not	  just	  hard	  but	  hopeless.)	  
Totality.	  Grounded	  robots	  with	  the	  sensorimotor	  and	  learning	  capacities	  of	  subhuman	  animals	  might	  serve	  as	  waystations,	  but	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  Turing	  methodology	  is	  to	  avoid	  being	  fooled	  by	  arbitrary	  fragments	  of	  performance	  capacity.	  Human	  language	  provides	  a	  natural	  totality.	  (There	  are	  no	  partial	  languages,	  in	  which	  you	  can	  say	  this,	  but	  not	  that.)	  We	  are	  also	  extremely	  good	  at	  “mind-­‐reading”	  human	  sensorimotor	  performance	  capacity	  for	  tell-­‐tale	  signs	  of	  mindlessness;	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  good	  we	  are	  with	  animals	  (apart	  perhaps	  from	  the	  movements	  and	  facial	  expressions	  of	  the	  higher	  mammals).	  
Terms.	  There	  are	  certain	  terms	  (or	  concepts)	  I	  have	  not	  found	  especially	  useful.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  real	  objects	  -­‐-­‐	  plus	  (internal	  or	  external)	  (1)	  analogs	  or	  iconic	  copies	  of	  objects	  (similar	  in	  shape)	  and	  (2)	  arbitrary-­‐shaped	  symbols	  in	  a	  formal	  symbol	  system	  (such	  as	  “x”	  and	  “=”,	  or	  the	  words	  in	  a	  language,	  apart	  from	  their	  
iconic	  properties),	  systematically	  interpretable	  as	  referring	  to	  objects	  -­‐-­‐	  	  are	  entities	  enough.	  Peirce’s	  “icon/index/symbol”	  triad	  seems	  one	  too	  many.	  	  Perhaps	  an	  index	  is	  just	  a	  symbol	  in	  a	  toy	  symbol	  system.	  In	  a	  formal	  symbol	  system	  the	  links	  between	  symbols	  are	  syntactic	  whereas	  the	  links	  between	  internal	  symbols	  and	  the	  external	  objects	  that	  they	  are	  about	  are	  sensorimotor	  (hence	  somewhat	  iconic).	  And	  inasmuch	  as	  symbols	  inside	  a	  Turing-­‐scale	  robot	  are	  linked	  to	  object	  categories	  rather	  than	  to	  unique	  (one-­‐time,	  one-­‐place)	  individuals,	  all	  categories	  are	  abstract	  (being	  based	  on	  the	  extraction	  of	  sensorimotor	  invariants),	  including,	  of	  course,	  the	  category	  “symbol.”	  The	  rest	  is	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  degree-­‐of-­‐abstraction.	  Even	  icons	  are	  abstract,	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  are	  neither	  identical	  nor	  co-­‐extensive	  with	  the	  objects	  they	  resemble.	  There	  are	  also	  two	  sorts	  of	  productivity	  or	  generativity:	  syntactic	  and	  semantic.	  The	  former	  is	  just	  formal;	  the	  	  latter	  is	  natural	  language’s	  power	  to	  express	  any	  and	  every	  truth-­‐valued	  proposition.	  
Talk.	  Yes,	  language	  is	  fundamentally	  social	  in	  that	  it	  would	  never	  have	  bothered	  to	  evolve	  if	  we	  had	  been	  solitary	  monads	  (even	  monads	  born	  mature:	  no	  development,	  just	  cumulative	  learning	  capacity).	  But	  the	  nonsocial	  environment	  gives	  enough	  corrective	  feedback	  for	  us	  to	  learn	  categories.	  Agreeing	  on	  what	  to	  call	  them	  is	  trivial.	  What	  is	  not	  trivial	  is	  treating	  symbol	  strings	  as	  truth-­‐valued	  propositions	  that	  describe	  or	  define	  categories.	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